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In the Suprente Court of the
State of Utal1

FAIRFIELD IRRIGATION COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

CASE

vs.
ERNEST CARSON and MRS. ERNEST \/
CARSON, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

NO. 7670

I

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT

Appellants' brief opens with a "Statement of the Case"
which adequately reflects the nature of this controversy.
Both parties claim the· right to use the water issuing from
t\vo artesian wells located a short distance west of Fairfield, Utah. Some of the evidence concerning the use of
this water in the past was in conflict. The conflicts were
resolved in respondent's favor by the trial court. The
statement of facts by apellants recites the evidence which
they presented, but which the trial court refused to accept
as true. Appellants omit the conflicting evidence which
the court found to be true.
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The appellants at the trial and in their brief on appeal
bottom their case to a large extent on the fact that they
acquired ownership of the 1.9 acres of land upon which
the two wells were drilled. It should be noted that when
D. L. Thomas acquired the 1.9 acres in 1913 by tax deed,
the deed was silent as to water (Ex. 2). Under what is
now Section 100-1-11, U.C.A., 1943, any water rights would
have followed the land under such a tax deed if the water
rights had been appurtenant to the land. Black v. Johnson, 81 Utah 410, 18 P. (2d) 901. However, respondent
contends that (a) the water had been abandoned by Sunshine Water Line Company in 1905 and the rights had reverted to the public long prior to 1913, (b) that the water
had been forfeited because of non-use, and (c) the water
had never been used on the land (the 1.9 acres) and was
thus never appurtenant to it. The subsequent quiet title
action against Sunshine Water Line Company did not
strengthen appellant's position. It did not mention water
rights at all, and merely quieting title to the land would
not give any rights to the water unless the water were appurtenant to the land.
Appellants.' other contention that the water,· even if
abandoned or forfeited, had been appropriated by appellants through usage, simply can not stand in the face of
the evidence on usage since 1905.
Respondent admitted at the pretrial (Pl. 46) that the
water rights in question were owned by Sunshine Water
Line Company in about 1895. Respondent does not claim
any privity with Sunshine Water Line Company, but bases
its contention that it now owns the water rights entirely
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upon an apropriation after 1905 when it is conclusively
shown that Sunshine Water Line Company ceased using
the water (R. 232,, 160, 351). Respondent contends that
the water reverted to the public and became subject to public appropriation because (a) it was abandoned by Sunshine
Water Line Company in 1905, and (b) it was forfeited because of statutory non-use for over seven years. Since the
water in question was underground water, it could have
been appropriated until 1935, simply by diversion and application to a beneficial use. Hansen v. Salt Lake City,
(Utah) 205 P. (2d) 255. We have never been able to see
any logic in the contention made by appellants that this
water is, insofar as respondent is concerned, surface water,
but that as to appellants it is underground water. Whether
water is surface or ground water is a physical fact, and it
is either ground water as to both of us or it is surface wa- ·
ter as to both. As a matter of fact, the water does come
from dug wells which are over 80 feet in depth, (R. 157)
and it is underground water. However, even if it must be
classed as surface water, because it comes to the surface
through artesian pressure, it makes no difference here for
the only application filed with the State Engineer after
1905 and prior to the trial was filing No. 21275, made by
respondent. Thus respondent either appropriated the water by usage, if it be classed as ground water, or by application if it be classed as surface water.
The respondent's position can best be presented by diseussing the pertinent facts in connection with the various
propositions of law involved. The order of presentation
will, for the most part, follo\v that used by the appellants.
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ARGUMENT

THE WATER ISSUING FROM THE WELLS
WAS NEVER APPURTENANT TO THE 1.9 ACRES O·F
GROUND ACQUiRED BY APPELLANTS, AND THEY
ARE NOT THE. SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST TO SUNSHINE WATER LINE. COMPANY.
I.

As point number 1, appellants urge that they are the
successors in interest to the Sunshine Water Line Company. They have no deed to the water. The tax deed dated
August 4, 1913, describes the 1.9 acres of land, but is silent
as to water (Ex. 2). Since 1880 there has been a statute
providing that appurtenant water rights pass with a deed
to the land unless expressly reserved. Laws of Utah 1880,
Sec. 9, Chapter 20. The section in effect when D. L.
Thomas (predecessor of appellants) acquired the tax deed
was Section 52, Chapter 108, p. 160, Laws of Utah, 1905.
This statute was almost identical to Section 100-1-11, U.
C. A., 1943. Under a statute such as this when water rights
are expressly mentioned, the burden is on appellants to show
that the water from the wells was, in 1913, when the tax
deed issued, appurtenant to the land conveyed. See Kinney, Irrigation & Water Rights, Vol. 2, p. 1794.
Whether or not a water right is appurtenant to a particular tract of land is a question of fact. Re. Johnson's
Estate, 64 Utah 114, 228 P. 748; Cortella v. Salt Lake City,
93 Utah 236, 72 P. (2d) 630.
We contend, and th~ cases hold, that water must be
used on or for the benefit of the land before it will be considered appurtenant to that land. This seems clear from ..
Section 100-1-11, U. C. A., 1943, which expressly makes
the water appurtenant to the last land upon which it was
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used. It states that when water is used on several tracts,
the water \vill pass with the parcel of land upon which it
was used "next preceding the time of the execution of any
conveyance thereof.'' This is very material here, because
the water from the \Veils has never been used on the 1.9
acres of land which appellants acquired by mesne conveyances from Sunshine Water Line Company. (Evidence
detailed below.) In fact, the only use of the water by Sunshine Water Line Company was at the mine some five miles
a\vay (R. 156).
In Cortella v. Salt Lake City, 93 Utah 236, 72 P. (2d)
630, the court noted: (p. 259 Utah Reports)
"Before Cortella can rely on ownership of a water right as an appurtenance to his land, he must first
show that such right was an appurtenance, one essential of which is that the water right was in fact used
upon said land.''
The court went on to hold that Cortella could not maintain
an action based on the theory that ownership of the land
carried with it as an appurtenance a right to receive water,
because he had failed to show that the water was, in fact,
being used on the lands at the time he acquired it.
This matter was also considered generally by the Utah
Supreme Court in Woolley v. Dowse, 86 Utah 221, 41 P.
(2d) 709. There the court noted that the water in question was not at the time of the sale used on the tract in
question and that it had not been used on the tract for over
20 years. The court, on the strength of this fact alone,
held that the water was not in fact appurtenant to the land
and must be treated as entirely unconnected with the land.
In Duchesne County v. Humpherys, 106 Utah 332, 148
P. (2d) 338, the county had acquired title to certain lands
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by tax deed. It was asserted by reason of the tax title the
county had acquired the ownership of several applications
'·
to appropriate
water. The court noted that the water had
never in fact been used on the lands thus sold to the county. The court, therefore, held that the water was not appurtenant to the land and that no interest passed to the
county.
In Melrose v. Cooley, (Cal.) 196 P. 105, plaintiff's husband owned a placer mine known as the Missouri Placer.
He constructed a pipeline and flume on this claim to divert
water from a stream known as Missouri Ravine. The water was not used on the Missouri Placer, (where the diversion was made and the line constructed) , but was taken
to another placer claim known as the Ocean Star. He conveyed the first placer to his wife (plaintiff) by a deed that
was silent as to the water and pipeline. Plaintiff claimed
ownership on the theory that they passed to her as appurtenances.
The court said:
"
. it (is) clear to our minds that the
plaintiff acquired no interest in the pipeline by virtue
of the conveyance to her by her husband of the Missouri Placer mine. There was no mention of the pipeline in said instrument of conveyance, and the said
pipeline was neither appurtenant to nor a fixture of
said mine, for it was not used or even intended to be
used with that mine or for its benefit or in working
or developing said mine.''
The California case is a close parallel to the instant
case. Here, as the facts detailed below will show, Sunshine
Water Line ·Company did not use the water on the 1.9 acres
where the wells. were drilled. It pumped the water some
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five miles to a mine. ·clearly a purchaser of the mine, at
the time the pumps were operating, would have acquired
the water as an appurtenance to the mine.
To the same effect, that \Vater must be used on the
land in order to be apurtenant to it, see Wiel, Water Right
in the Western States, Vol. 1, p. 586, wherein it is stated:
''Whether a water right is an appurtenance, depends on whether it is an incident, necessary to the
enjoyment of the land. The water right is not necessarily appurtenant to or parcel of any land; and whether it is an appurtenance or parcel is a question of fact
resting chiefly upon whether it was used specially for
the benefit of the land in question. When used for irrigation, there will seldom be doubt of such necessity.
A water right or ditch right is appurtenant only to
such land of a large tract as had been actually irrigated from it. A water right is incidental or appurtenant to land when by right .used with the land for
its benefit."
See also Kinney, Irrigation and Water Rights, Vol. II,
sec. 1011, p. 1803.
In the light of the above authorities we submit (1)
that the burden of showing that the water was appurtenant to the 1.9 acres was on appellant, (Kinney, p. 1794)
and (2) that since the evidence shows conclusively that
the water was never used on nor for the benefit of the 1.9
acres it was never appurtenant thereto.
There is no evidence from which the trial court could
have found that the well water was ever used on or for the
benefit of the 1.9 acres of land which appellants acquired
by mesne conveyances from Sunshine Water Line Company. Appellant Ernest Carson admitted that there was
no use of water on the 1.9 acres. On page 11 he said he
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could think of no use made of the water except at the
mine; p. 14, there had never been any feed racks on the
1.9 acres; p. 15, no stock watering troughs or other facilities; p. 18, he never saw water being used to irrigate the 1.9
acres (R. 11, 14, 15 & 18). Engineer Gardner testified that
it was not possible to irrigate the 1.9 acres by gravity from
the wells, that the wells were located on the· extreme south
edge of this 1~9 acre tract and the slope was to the south
(R. 115) . Exhibit E shows location of the wells on the 1.9
acre tract (R. 112) . Later in the trial Ernest Carson testified about a small garden near the well, but he admitted
that he did not know whether or not any part of it was on
the 1.9 acres (R. 456). Witness Thomas also testified that
the 1.9 acres was not irrigated from the wells (R. 161).
Every witness testifying who could remember back
prior to 1905 testified that waters from the wells, and the
sump which was used before the wells were drilled, were
pumped by Sunshine Water Line Company to the mines
located some five miles from the wells (R. 156, 157, 159, 214,
230). There can be no doubt that the sump and the wells
were dug to supply water for the mine. There is no evidence that Sunshine Water Line c·ompany had any other
land in the vicinity of the wells, nor that it had any operations around the wells except a pump house for lifting the
water to the mine. The court in findings 3, 6 and 7 expressly found all of the above facts to be true. Then in
finding number 8 it found that the holes in the ground and
the well casing were a part of the real estate, not as an appurtenance, but because they at all times were so situated
that they became part of it. From this last fact the court
concluded that the "water rights" were appurtenant to the
1.9 acres of land. This, we submit, was erroneous. The
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water right is not the hole nor the casing. It is the right
to use the water issuing from the wells. This right was
not acquired for the benefit of the 1.9 acres, it was not used
on said land, and the rights were not appurtenant to the
land.
Since the water rights were not appurtenant to the
1.9 acres, and since appellants acquired no other lands from
Sunshine Water Line Company, there is no privity between
Sunshine Water Line Company and appellants. The tax
deed and the subsequent action quieting title to the land
did not pass to appellants any interest in the water, and
because of this fact alone they cannot succeed on the theory that they are successors in interest to Sunshine Water
Line Company. In addition, it is clear that the water had
reverted to the public prior to said deeds, and even an express deed from Sunshine \Vater Line Company in 1913
could have passed nothing. This is discussed below as point
II.
II. SUNSIDNE WATER LINE COMPANY EITHER
(A) ABANDONED ITS WATER RIGHT, OR (B) LOST
THE RIGHT BY REASON OF NON-USER UNDER THrE
FORFEITURE STATUTE.

We contend that under the evidence the court correctly found that Sunshine Water Line Company abandoned
the wells and all of its rights therein. We distinguish in
this regard between abandonment and forfeiture. The former we consider to be an intentional relinquishment of a
right, and the latter the forced relinquishment which comes
from continuous non-use for the statutory period~ Wellsville East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land and Livestock, 104 Utah 448, 137 P. (2d) 634. Abandonment does
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not depend upon any particular lapse of time. Rather, the
intent of the appropriator, as evidenced by conduct, should
be considered, and is to a very large extent controlling.
Abandonment

The cases which distinguish between forfeiture and
abandonment and which ·discuss the elements of abandonment are as follows: Promontory Ranch Co. v. Argile (1904),
28 Utah 398, 79 P. 47; Deseret Livestock v. Hooppiania,
(1925) 66 Utah 25, 239 P. 479; Torsak v. Reukabina,
(1926) 67 Utah 166, 246 P. 367; Hammond v. Johnson,
(1937) 94 ,Utah 20, 66 P. (2d) 894; and the Wellsville case,
supra.
These cases hold that two things are necessary for an
abandonment: (a) An intention to abandon, or relinquish
the right, and (b) an act to effectuate that intent. The
appellants in their brief talk only of statutory forfeiture,
and assert that the forfeiture statute could not have been
intended to apply to underground water. This argument,
of course, does not consider the question of abandonment.
Abandonment has always been known to the common law.
It has not been restricted to water rights or to any other
particular species of property. Any property can be and
for centuries could have been abandoned under common
law principles. This was not dependent on any statute and
was always known to water law, independent of statute.
The subject matter· is fully discussed by Weil, "Water
Rights in the Western States.," Vol. 1, Chap. 604, Sec. 567.
The discussion by Weil of the common law principal of
abandonment, as related to water, covers over ten pages
and is followed by an equally lengthy discussion of the
doctrine of forfeiture. We will not lengthen this brief by
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quotes, but note only that Weil states that the law of appropriation arose as a branch of the law of possessory
rights on the public domain. The retention of possession
with a bona fide intention has always been a condition upon which retention of the right was based. The relinquishment of possession with the intent to abandon has always
constituted an abandonment of the right. This required
a concurrence of act and intent. The act had to constitute
a relinquishment of possession and the intent was an intention not to resume possession for beneficial use. Abandonment is always a voluntary matter. Weil goes on to
note that abandonment must be made by the owner without any desire that any other person shall acquire the owner's interest in it. There is no such thing as an abandonment to a particular person or abandonment for a consideration. The right, once abandoned, can not be revived
by a sale, and a purported sale passes nothing.
In view of the numerous Utah cases which have recognized the doctrine of abandonment and the uniform recognition of the doctrine by all of the text writers., there
would seem to be no doubt under the authorities that any
water rights could have been abandoned in 1905. In fact,
the Promontory Ranch case, supra, was decided in 1904,
and \Vhile the court there held that the facts did not show
an abandonment, the court, nevertheless, recognized the
doctrine. It should also be noted that in an earlier case,
Stalling v. Ferrin, 7 Utah 477, decided in 1891, the doctrine
of abandonment :vvas expressly recognized, and the court
expressly held that an irrigation ditch which had been
ploughed over and the ground planted to grass had been
abandoned.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
The trial court expressly found in this case that there
had been a common law abandonment. (See Conclusion of
Law No. 6). The facts upon which such conclusion was
based were not disputed. In 1898 the Sunshine Water Line
Company acquired 1.9 acres of land, upon which the wells
were drilled (Defendant's Exhibit 2). At some time prior
to 1900 the company dug a sump on this 1.9 acre tract, and
water was pumped from the sump for a distance of approximately five miles to certain mine properties (R. 152,
156, 97, 155, 230). In about 1900 the two wells in question were drilled, one to a depth of approximately 160 feet,
and the other to a depth of about 80 feet (R. 157). After
the wells were drilled, the water flowed into the sump and
was then pumped to the mine (R. 154-7). The water was
used by Sunshine Water Line Company only for the mine;
it had no use whatever for the water in the vicinity of the
1.9 acres. The evidence showing no use on the 1.9 acres is
detailed under point I.
In 1905 Sunshine Water Line Company ceased its
pumping operations. This date was definitely fixed by two
witnesses (R. 160, 232, 351) and there is no evidence to
the contrary. No use of this water by Sunshine Water
Line Company has ever been made since that date. Sunsine Water Line ·Company did not pay its taxes in the year
1905, and the lands were sold for the 1905 taxes (Ex. 2).
The taxes were not paid thereafter on the land, and Sunshine Water Line Company lost title to the land by reason
of the tax title (Ex. 2). Thomas testified that Sunshine
Water Line Company abandoned everything in 1905 and
sold the pipeline (R. 160); and that the company was de'funct (165). The pipeline was taken up and the pumping
facilities dismantled (R. 11, 160, 232, 309). Witness DuBois
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testified that in 1911 he worked on a project removing one
segment of the line. At that time other segments had
already been removed. The digging which was done in removing the other sections had been done so long ago, that it
was difficult in 1911 to ascertain where the pipeline had previously run, for time had erased almost all signs of previous
digging (R. 309). Upon this showing that Sunshine Water
Line Company was defunct, that it had ceased pumping, .
had taken up its pipeline, and had permitted the land and
all facilities to be sold for taxes in 1905 and had abandoned
everything, the court concluded that there was an ab~n
donment of the water. This, of course, was also accompanied by the fact that from 1905 to 1913 when D·. L.
Thomas purchased the 1.9 acres on tax sale, no use whatever \vas made of the waters by Sunshine Water Line Company (R. 30, 166, 344).
Whether or not a \Vater right has been abandoned is
always a question of fact, which is for the the tryer of the
fact, in this case, the trial court. The court found as a
fact that there was an abandonment. The evidence adduced from which the court found an abandonment is cerfully adequate to support that conclusion as a factual matter. Since the water was abandoned, it reverted to the
people and became subject to the law of appropriation.
This being true, it is immaterial whether or not the facts
also show a forfeiture, but we think the facts also would
show a statutory forfeiture, and it is to be noted that the
court also ruled that there had been a forfeiture.
Forfeiture
The first statute on forfeiture in Utah is Section 9,Laws of Utah, 1880, Chap. 20. Since that time there has
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always been a prov1s1on that water rights would be forfeited if not used. The statute in effect in 1905 when Sunshine Water Line Company ceased its pumping operations
was Chap. 108, Sec. 52, p. 160, Laws of Utah, 1905. It
was there provided:
"When the appropriator, or his successor in interest, abandons or ceases to use water for a period
of seven years, the right ceases, and thereupon such
water reverts to the public and can again be appropriated, as provided in this act; but questions of abandonment shall be questions of fact, and shall be determined, as are other questions of fact."
It is true, as apellants state, that there are numerous
cases from our Supreme Court in years subsequent to 1905
holding that underground water belonged to the owner of
the soil. However, this concept has been changed by recent eases, the most recent of which is Riordan v. Westwood, (Utah) 203 P. (2d) 922. In that case underground
water was placed in the same class as surface water insofar as being subject to the law of public appropriation is
concerned. The court expressly noted that water cases
must now be treated as though such had always been the
law in this state. If underground water has always been
subject to the law of appropriation, as this court has now
held in the Riordan case, then certainly statutes such as
this forfeiture statute would apply to underground water.
There isn't any doubt that the present Section 100-1-4,
U. C. A., 1943, applies to underground water, because it
expressly says so. It thus appears that there was a statute in effect at all tirnes from 1905 to 1913, providing for
forfeiture of water rights for seven years of non-use. There
also is no doubt under the evidence that the water was not
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used by Sunshine Water Line Company or anyone else in
its behalf from 1905 to 1913. All of the witnesses testify..
ing about this period freely admitted that they knew of no
use of the water by Sunshine Water Line Company during this period. The appellan1) Ernest Carson said that
from the time Sunshine Water Line Company quit pumping until 1913 the wells were open and the water was flowing into the spring (R. 30). He also testified that there
\Vas no use of this water from 1900 until 1930, except people hauling it away in wagons for culinary use, and for
some irrigation of land owned by Ernest Carson's father
(R. 32). A witness with no interest whatever in the outcome of this suit \Vas Mr. Jacob, He was there in 1900 and
was there every year from 1900 until 1930. He testified
that the water from the wells was running down a small
ravine into the springs (R. 77-80). Mr. McKinney, who
was 84 years old, could remember the entire history of
these \Veils. He testified that the wells ran directly down
a ravine and into the springs (R. 88). Witness Thomas
also could remember the entire history of these wells. He
testified that the water ran directly from the wells to the
spring (R. 158) that after Sunshine Water Line Company
quit pumping the water ran directly to the springs (R.
161). From 1905 to 1913 no one used the well waters;
(R. 166) they just ran into the springs; (R. 167) they flowed
all the time. (R. 168) He stated that the wells were not
capped after 1905. (R. 217) Witness Smith likewise so
testified, (R. 351, 354) and there simply isn't any evidence
to the contrary. The water wasn't used by Sunshine Water Line Company. after ·1905. No one else claimed privity
with Sunshine Water Line Company. until 1913, when D.
L. Thomas acquired the tax deed (Defendants' Ex. 2).
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Thereafter, Thomas made practically no use of the water
between 1913 and 1930. There is evidence that he hauled
small quantities of it away in wagons for culinary use, but
there is no other evidence of any other direct use by
Thomas. At this same period of time the wells were treated
as a public watering hole (R. 82) with all of the surrounding dry farmers getting their culinary water from the wells,
the sheepmen and travelers water their sheep, and except
for this small quantity of water which was hauled away by
the general pubUc, all of the water ran directly into the
springs of the Fairfield Irrigation Company. No one asked
permission of D. L. Thomas, or any one else, to water there,
no one attempted to exercise any control over the water,
and even the appellant, Ernest Carson,. admitted that the
above situation prevailed (R. 34).
III. THE WELL WATER WAS APPRO,PRIATED
BY THE RESPO·NDENT BY USAGE.
There are numerous cases which hold that since 1903
a filing with the State Engineer is indispensable to an appropriation of surface water. See for example, Wellsville
East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay Land and Livestock c·o., 104
Utah 448, 137 P. (2d) 634; Smith v. Sanders, 189 P. (2d)
701; Duchesne County v. Humpherys, 106 Utah 332, 148
P. (2d) 338.
These cases do not control insofar as underground water· is concerned. The statutes governing the method of
appropriation were not amended to include underground
water until 1935. Laws of Utah, 1935, Ch. 105. On page
158_ of Vol. 86 o~ the Utah Reports, Justice Folland recom- _
mended to the Legislature in Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 Utah
50, that the appropriation of ground water be brought un-
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der the authority of the State Engineer. This was done
by the 1935 amendment noted above. Thus until 1935 a
diligence right to use ground water could be initiated by
usage alone. Uater in Hansen v. Salt Lake City, (Utah)
205 P. (2d) 255, the court expressly held that underground
water could be appropriated by usage alone prior to 1935.
Insofar as the evidence on usage is concerned, it is conclusively in support of the trial court's findings. There
isn't any doubt under the evidence that from 1905 until
1934 the wells were uncapped and the water from the wells
was flowing directly into a small ravine and then into the
springs. The detail of the evidence will be set out on this
point below. The wells were located only 375 feet from the
spring (R. 106). The slope of the ground is from the wells
to the spring, and the wells are 8.5 feet higher than the
springs (R. 106) . The wells ·were drilled a short distance
east from a natural \Vash or ravine {R. 68, 77, 87, 88, 142,
153, 158). Because of the slope of the ground and the short
distance involved, it would have been impossible to hold
the water issuing from the \Veils out of the springs {R. 113,
389). There was never any pipeline, ditch or other facility
\Vhich would convey the \Vater away from the wells after
1905 when the Sunshine Water Line ·Company line wastaken up {R. 21, 14). There was-no ditch by which water ·could
be used to irrigate land in the vicinity of the well {R. 223,
249, 312, 354, 491). Carson testified that he had irrigated
approximately one acre between the wells and the spring
(R. 32). l-Ie was not corroborated by any other witness.
The trial judge inspected the premises where he had an
opporttmity to see if there were artificial ditches or areas
which gave the appearance of regular irrigation. There
were numerous \Vitnesses who testified that there were no
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artificial ditches, and that the ground gave no appearance
of having been irrigated (R. 77, 89, 90, 118, 223, 249, 312,
354, 491). Numerous witnesses testified that the well water ran directly from the well into a ravine and down the
ravine into the spring (R. 158, 161, 177, 209, 210, 215, 220,
232, 310, 353, 355, 290). Carson himself admitted that
he knew of no use by Sunshine Water Line Company after
it quit pumping; (R. 29) that from the time Sunshine Water Line Company quit pumping until 1913, the wells were
open. (R. 30). He knew of no use from 1905 to 1930, except people hauling the water away and the claimed irrigation of one acre (R. 329). He admits there were only
about twenty dry farmers and a few sheepmen hauling water away (R 33). He admits that the one acre which he
claims was irrigated was never owned by Sunshine Water
Line Company (R. 460), nor was it ever owned by anyone
who owned the land on which the wells were drilled. The
only time he could remember that the wells were shut off
prior to 1934 was a few occasions when various people
would shut off the water from the wells so that the ground
around the wells would dry enough to permit wagons to
get up to the pipe (R. 462). He admits the wells were not
plugged prior to 1934, when the water was pumped to Manning (R 459). Carson said that Sunshine Water Line Company never used the water after it quit pumping (R. 30),
and the only use made after 1913 by D. L. Thomas was to
haul some 300 to 600 gallons a day for dom~stic use (R.
458). However, Thomas had a well in 1913 or 1914 and
did not have to haul water after that (R. 485). Numerous other witnesses were called, who had had frequent opportunities to observe the wells and every other witness
testified that the wells were always open and running di-
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rectly into the spring. (See Witness Nichols, R. 67-68; Witness Jacob, R. 77; Witness McKinney, R. 89, 90; Witness
Thomas, R. 158, 161, 166-169, 217, 232; Armstrong, R. 289,
290; Smith, 354-5; Delbert Carson, 395, 389, 390).
It is, therefore, clear under all of the evidence that the
wells ran directly into the springs from 1905 until 1934,
with at the most only small and infrequent uses by the general public. Carson testified that he gave permission to
people to use the well, but on cross examination he confessed that this so-called permission was simply a failure
to protest (R. 34) . By the time (1942) Carson finally took
control of the waters, by capping the wells, he was President of the respondent company. He capped them after
having been requested to do so by the State Engineer.
The evidence was uncontroverted that as the waters
from the wells reached the Fairfield Springs, they were
used the year round by the Fairfield people for stock watering, domestic, culinary and irrigation purposes. No one
denied that this was so (R. 20) . Of course, all of the waters of Fairfield Springs were being used for irrigation purposes from a date prior to 1886, (R 147-149) so that as the
waters reached the springs and commingled with the spring
waters, the respondent and its predecessors in interest used
the water all of the time from 1905 to 1934. The trial
court so found, and the overwhelming weight of the evidence is to that effect.
IV. USAGE BY CARSON AND THOMAS WAS
N·OT SUFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE AN APPRO·PRIATION.
The Utah cases make it clear that even public water
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riated by usage alone, that usage had to be more than an
occasional use with other members of the public. For example, in Patterson v. Ryan, 37 Utah 410, 108 P. 1118, one
of the parties had used the water intermittently since prior
to 1903. He had made some improvements which would
be at least comparable to the "stand pipe" allegedly installed by D. L. Thomas. Other sheepmen used the water,
too, as was done in this case. Tfte Supreme Court held
that this intermittent, non-exclusive use would not constitute an appropriation. On this point (use by Thomas)
we consider this Patterson case to be directly in point. To
the same effect, see Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View
Duck C'lub, 50 ,Utah 76, 166 P. 309.
In 1934 Carson did lease the well water to a company
for pumping to Manning. There isn't any dispute that the
water was piped from the wells to Manning from late 1934
until August of 1937 (R. 308). If, (a) the water had not
already been appropriated, and (b) it could be appropriated by usage alone, this usage by Manning would have
constituted an appropriation. However, if usage alone
would apropriate this water, it had long since been appropriated by the respondent and its predecessors, who had used
the water continuously from 1905 to 1934. The water,
therefore, was not subject to appropriation at the time of
the pumping to Manning. . It is not possible for this threeyear use by Manning to be considered as an acquisition of
title by adverse use. First, because the adverse use period
is seven years, and secondly, because during the year 1934,
Ernest Carson was by his own admission watermaster of
the stream. As to the adverse use period, see Wellsville
East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land and Livestock,
104 'Utah 448, 137 P. (2d) 634. As to the fact that Carson
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could not adverse the people for whom he worked as water master, see Center Creek Water and Irrigation Company v. Lindsay, 21 Utah 192, and Tanner v. Provo Reservoir, 99 Utah 139, 98 P. (2d) 695. At all times after 1934,
Carson was either the water master in charge of the distribution of the water or president of the respondent company, and he ·certainly could have acquired no rights adverse to it after 1934.
Summary on this Point
The evidence is conclusive that from 1905 to 1934 all
of the water from the wells flowed directly to the springs
and was. used by the respondent and its predecessors for
beneficial use during all of those years. Carson, while water master, pumped the water for a short time to Manning
and thereafter \Vhile president of the respondent company,
capped the wells from time to time. He made no use of
the water himself, except as a stockholder in the respondent company; his predecessor in the ownership of the 1.9
acres never used the water e~cept as a member of the general public, and Sunshine vVater Line Company didn't use
the water at all after 1905. If usage alone will constitute
an appropriation, the respondent appropriated all of the
water by usage from 1905 to 1934. If usage alone will not
constitute an appropriation, then the only statutory filing
was the filing made by the respondent. Therefore, the waters either -could be appropriated by usage and the respondent so appropriated it, or it could not, and, therefore, the
application filed by respondent was effective to appropriate
it.
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V:. THE RESPONDENT HAS AN EASEMENT TO
KEE'P THE CHANNEL OPEN.
It is clear from the evidence that since prior to 1886
the Fairfield people have used all of the water from Fairfield Springs (R. 147-149). (See also R. 150, 229). The
wells were abandoned by Sunshine Water Line Company
in 1905, and as outlined in the section next above, the waters ran free for the next twenty-nine years. All of the
people in the Fairfield area went to the wells, filled their
wagons, maintained a stand pipe to get the water from
the well into their wagons, and used the same as though it
were a public watering hole (R. 82, 69). There is no evidence whatever that anyone ever interfered with this usage or that anybody ever asked permission to so utilize
the land or the well. The spring area was always treated
as a town picnic area, and the parties claimed the right to
go to the springs at all times (R. 346). If the appellant
Carson is ·restrained from interfering with the natural flow
of the spring and the wells, there is little need for anybody
to ever. cross any section of his land to get the water. Therefore, the right of way is not particularly important. If
the wells are left on, they will flow to the spring, and nobody could stop them from so doing (R. 113, 389, 395).
Carson, of course, was president of the respondent eompany
at all times since the State Engineer required the capping
of the wells, and there is no question that he capped them
from time to time after 1942. Prior thereto the wells were
apparently never capped except when Manning ·completed
its pumping operations, for there is no evidence that the
wells were capped prior to 1934 by anybody. There would,
therefore, be little need to go up to the wells except to obtain water, and this the public did for over thirty years
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before the pumping to Manning. From there on, Carson,
as water master and president of the company, managed
the affairs. Certainly, there exists a right in the owner of
these water rights to go up the natural ·channels for the
purpose of keeping the flow coming do\vn as they have
been accustomed to do for over fifty years. . There was no
trouble in this matter until Carson attempted to dig a new
ditch east of the wells and to divert the water from the well
area so as to keep it from commingling with the springs.
Carson is the one who is attempting to upset the status
quo.
When Carson permitted Manning to pump the water,
there was much "grumbling" in the town, (R. 279, 342)
but everyone needed work and nothing was done about it.
The job of laying the pipeline furnised work to most of the
people of Fairfield (R. 279). There was no organization
among the water users at that time, and Ernest Carson was.
the water master, so the people accepted the job and permitted the water to be p~ped out of the area. Other than
this short period of use by Carson, the water always has
gone to the springs. Carson now wants to change this condition which has prevailed for 45 years, and take the water into his ovvn ditch. Fairfield is a very small community of approximately fifty families, and almost everyone in
the town is a user of water from the springs.
VI.

TRESPASSES BY THE PLAINTIFF.

There is no doubt that the plaintiff trespassed on appellants' ground. There was no attempt to deny that such
was the case, because surveys had been made and persons
had gotten off the channels and the streams. There certainly is no evidence which would justify a finding that
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once this trouble is settled, further trespasses will occur.
The court found in favor of the appellants on the issue of
trespass, and assessed nominal damages. There was no
evidence of actual damage, nor could there have been. The
country is typical desert, uncultivated ground, which
couldn't possibly be damaged by people crossing it. It is
hard for us to see any possible error which the court committed in refus.ing to enjoin the respondent from trespassing on this ground in the future, and of course the nominal damages are all that the appellants proved.
VII.
VALID.

THE APPLICATION OF RESPONDENT IS

Under Point No. 7 of appellants' brief, it is urged that
the application is void. No authority of any kind is cited
to support this contention. The application is in all particulars in accordance with the requirements of Title 100,
Utah ·Code Annotated, 1943. It has every blank properly
filled in and is not too indefinite as to location. Fourteen
separate springs are specifically listed -by the exact point
of issuance. The two wells in question are also covered
by exact point descriptions. The application then defines
the basin area in which the applicant proposes to open up
the channels and appropriate water from the underground
through the means of drains and tunnels. The drains and
channels which applicant proposes to drill are not unduly
long, and certainly the matter is tied down about as deinitely as a spring area could be described. In view of this
fact, no statutory mandate has been ignored, and no authorities whatever have been assigned by appellants in support of the proposition that the application is void. We
respectfully submit that the application is in strict accord-
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ance with the statute; that the same was examined by the
State Engineer and \vas accepted by him for filing.
CONCLUSION
The findings of fact and conclusions of law are extremely detailed and are based on a lengthy momorandum
decision written by the trial judge. The matter has had
the most careful consideration of the trial judge. There
is no finding of fact by the trial judge for which there is
not direct supporting evidence. In fact, there is very little
conflicting evidence, for even Carson claims little use of
the water by him or his predecessors until 1934. It is clear
that Sunshine Water Line Company stopped using the wa~
ter in 1905, and that it never again used the water, that it
took up its pipeline, dismantled the pumping plant and permitted the land upon which the wells were located to be
sold for taxes. There was no attempt by Sunshine Water
Line Company to convey the land or water to appellants.
It did not have sufficient interest to defend the quiet title
suit, and the court correctly found an abandonment of the
water. Also, it is undisputed that for over eight years the
water was not used at all by Sunsine Water Line Company
or anyone in privity with Sunshine Water Line Company.
Under the forfeiture statute then in existence, a forfeiture
was conclusively shown. The water, therefore, reverted
to the public prior to the tax deed to the land in 1913.
Further, the appellants never had a deed to the water,
but must rely on the fact that they acquired the water as
an appurtenance to the 1.9 acres of ground. The evidence
conclusively shows that the water was not appurtenant to
the 1.9 acres, and, therefore, appellants have no privity
whatever with Sunshine Water Line Company, because (a)
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the water was not appurtenant, (b) they had no deed from
Sunshine Water Line Company to the water or the land,
and (c) the water had reverted to the public prior to the
tax sale.
The water came from depths of over 80 feet, and was
clearly ground water which could be appropriated by usage
alone until 1935. For 29 years from 1905 to 1934, the respondent and its predecessors used the water for beneficial
purposes all of the time. The only other use was by the
general public as a public water hole, but there was not an
exclusive use by anyone except the people who are now
the stockholders of the Fairfield Irrigation Company. The
short three-year use 'by Carson from 1934 to 1937 was too
short to transfer title under the doctrine of adverse use.
Further, Carson was water master in 1934, and thereafter
president of the respondent company during the time he
claims that he controlled the wells.
We respectfully submit that the trial judge correctly
decided the case, and that his decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
I

GEORGE s. BALLIF
EDWARD W. CLYDE
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